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Introduction
Experts predict that by the latter part of the 21st Century,
descendants of white Europeans will fall into minority status in the
United States.' The resulting breadth of ethnic diversity in the United
States is likely to permeate (although it does to a certain degree today
as well) all facets of social and political arenas, including health care,
education, welfare, and so on. Likewise, one might assume the
contents of mainstream media-live theater, movies, and especially
television, will follow suit and begin to accurately portray the diverse
population of "Americans."
Some may argue this process has already begun with the
proliferation and success of "black" family television programs such as
The Cosby Show, Living Single and Family Matters. Movies such as
Soul Food, The Joy Luck Club and Mi Familia, with casts that are
almost entirely of one ethnicity, are also broadening the scope of
content in mass media. In addition, the casting of non-white characters
in television programs is more prevalent today. Examples include
Ming-Na Wen, an Asian American, in The Single Guy, and the
emergence of "multicultural" casts on prime time television shows
such as ER and NYPD Blue.
Still, arguably, there is an insufficient number of minorities in film
and television and the current minority representation fails to
accurately reflect the diversity of contemporary society. Furthermore,
many of these existing roles are a result of typecasting and perpetuate
the transmission of negative images and stereotypes to the audience.2
Since the media are a very influential socializing factor, especially
when the audience is comprised of children, there is a need for a broad
range of positive role models on television and in major motion
pictures. Arguably, producers and directors will not spend their talents
and resources to create a product which does not have a potentially
large audience. Still, if the prediction regarding the future population
in the United States is correct, this argument likely fails.
In addition to the social implications of not accurately reflecting
America's diversity in the media, there are significant legal
1. America's Immigrant Challenge, TIME SPECIAL ISSUE, Fall 1993, at 3, 5.
2. See, e.g., Michael Omi, In Living Color: Race and American Cultures, in
CULTURAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 111 (Ian Angus & Sut Jhally eds.,
1989). Omi suggests that popular culture, especially visual media, is saturated with
stereotypical images of minorities and that these stereotypes "provide a framework of
symbols, concepts, and images through which we understand, interpret, and represent
aspects of our 'racial' existence." Id. at 114.
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implications regarding the employment of minority actors and
actresses. Specifically, do non-white actors and actresses encounter
racial discrimination during the hiring and casting process? If so, what
avenues exist to provide these actors with an appropriate legal
remedy? Assuming that a legal action is viable, what defenses might
the artist or casting director have? Historically, the performing arts
and the entertainment industry seem to be somewhat immune from
the application of the law regarding employment discrimination based
on race. There is no specific case law that directly addresses this area.
3
Perhaps the expressive nature of the arts dictate the entertainment
industry as a forum that should best be left to regulate itself. Still,
there is a significant economic aspect which affects the livelihood of
aspiring actors and actresses that may warrant some sort of
governmental regulation, or at least some viable legal relief, where
one feels she was unjustly denied an employment opportunity. Of
course, any attempt to regulate media, art, or "expressions" runs up
against the First Amendment4 rights of the artist. In her article,
Jennifer Sheppard comments on the relationship between the "lack of
employment opportunities for minority actors" and "[producers']
legitimate exercise of business judgment and artistic freedom."5 This
tension has resulted in several casting controversies, especially where
the script calls for a race-specific character. 6
This note discusses whether an actor or actress has a cause of
action against casting directors and/or producers under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act7 for employment discrimination based on
race. I analyze what constitutes a violation of the Act and the
procedural requirements a plaintiff must comply with in order to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Next, this note
addresses how the law does not effectively deal with this issue and
how this inapplicability of the law affects employment opportunities
for minority actors and actresses.
3. See Jennifer L. Sheppard, Theatrical Casting-Discrimination or Artistic
Freedom?, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 267,279 (1991).
4. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
5. Sheppard, supra note 3, at 271.
6. For a thorough discussion of the controversy resulting from casting of Jonathan
Pryce in the role of a Eurasian character, see Mabel Ng, Note, Miss Saigon: Casting for
Equality on an Unequal Stage, 14 HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J. 451 (1992).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994) [hereinafter the 1964 Act].
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Moreover, even if legal action was plausible under the current
law, I assert that there are certain practical obstacles as a result of
being an "employee" in the entertainment business, that may make it
more difficult, if not impossible, for an actor to carry out a charge of
discrimination. Finally, I propose that currently, the only appropriate
remedy is a non-legal one which requires a collaborative effort from
those who are closely involved in the industry-producers, directors,
actors and actresses, and the audience. I argue that government should
be excluded from this collaborative solution because of the unique
nature of the industry, even given the potential for discrimination.
I
Background: Casting Directors' Prerogatives Versus Actors'
Right to Equal Opportunity for Employment
A problem arises in the midst of increasing concern and
controversy in the entertainment industry over certain casting choices
directors make, particularly when the character calls for a specific
racial or ethnic background. Historically, white male actors performed
the majority of roles in theater, as well as on film.' Arguably, at the
birth and early stages of United States television and film industries,
white males dominated the scene due to the lack of minorities and
women who sought acting as a profession. This argument, of course, is
no longer valid today since those who attempt to succeed in the
entertainment industry constitute a diverse group of individuals
reflecting the growing diversity of the general United States
population.9
Consequently, in a field as competitive as acting, potential
employment opportunities may be rare and even non-existent for the
aspiring actor or actress. Directors take many factors into
8. Ng, supra note 6, at 453 (citing Stephanie Gutman & Phil West, Casting Call Still a
Whisper Hiring, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at 1).
9. Non-white ethnic groups in the 1990 census made up 28.7% of the United States
population. 1990 US Census Data (visited Feb. 9, 1998) <http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/
lookup/887052057>. However, according to the Screen Actors Guild ("SAG") employment
statistics for 1996, only 19% of SAG film and television jobs went to non-white SAG
actors. S.F. ACTOR, Winter 1997, at 3. Underscoring this discrepancy, SAG president
Richard Masur commented that, "a look at our ethnicity, gender and age-related
employment statistics for the last five years indicates that the entertainment industry is not
yet utilizing the broad spectrum of available SAG talent." Id. See also Fairness in the
Media Fact Sheet, IN MOTION MAG. (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.
inmotionmagazine.com/browse/publish/rainbowl.html>.
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consideration when making casting decisions.10 Since casting decisions
are predominantly based on subjective criteria, a rejected actor may
claim he was not chosen because of his race, irrespective of his ability
to act, and therefore bring a discrimination claim against the casting
director. The director may rebut this claim by asserting that race was
not a consideration and her decision was based on other criteria.
Alternatively, the director may admit race was a factor, but that there
is a valid reason for considering race such as having an accurate
portrayal of the character.
Title VII of the 1964 Act attempted to address this tension
between employer prerogatives and the employees' right to fair
employment opportunities." In addition to the legislative history, the
plain language of the statute indicates its purpose was to "achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees
over other employees."' 12 However, Congress has made clear that it
did not intend by Title VII to "guarantee a job to every person
regardless of qualifications.' 13
Case law interpreting Title VII established two standards to
balance the competing interests of the employer and the employee: 1)
the disparate treatment theory; and 2) the adverse impact theory.
Subsequent case law established the structure for necessary proof and
procedure under these two theories. However, it is unclear whether
Congress intended Title VII to cover the employment of actors and
actresses. Indeed it is questionable whether the performing arts
constitute employment at all. Even if the arts fall under the umbrella
of employment, tremendous practical barriers seem to preclude an
actor from bringing a successful Title VII action. Additionally,
subjecting directors to Title VII requirements when making casting
decisions raises a potential violation of First Amendment rights.
10. Casting Questions: Connery Too Old? Sofia Coppola Bum-Rapped?, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 1991, at 107 (letter to the editor); Nancy Randle, Star Makers/Casting Directors:
Behind-Scene Heroes, S.F. CHRON., July 25, 1993, at C2.
11. See, e.g., Senate Voting Record No. 61, 88th Cong. 2 (1964), reprinted in CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, 1945-1968, VOL. 13,
Securing the Enactment of Civil Rights Legislation, at 146-48 (Michal R. Belknap ed.,
1991).
12. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971).
13. Id. at 430.
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II
Analysis
Congress' passage of the 1964 Act signified the growing
intolerance of, and attempt to do away with, racial prejudice and
discrimination in the United States. One area of society Congress
targeted was the workplace. "In order to address the pervasive
problems of employment discrimination, Congress enacted a series of
statutes that deal with various aspects of the phenomenon."'14 These
statutes include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'5 the Equal
Pay Act of 1963,16 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967,'7 the Rehabilitation Act of 197318 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990.19 Title VII broadly proscribes discrimination
in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Specifically, it mandates that:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.20
Subsequent cases have laid out the framework for two types of
race discrimination in employment that violate Title VII. The first is a
disparate treatment action, where the plaintiff alleges the employer
committed a discriminatory act against a particular individual, the
plaintiff.21 Second is the adverse impact action, where the plaintiff
alleges an employer's practice or policy results in systemic
discrimination against a class of persons.22 For the reasons discussed
below, I posit neither theory is a viable avenue for relief for minority
actors and actresses.
14. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 91 (3d ed. 1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1994).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
21. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 248 (1981); St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
22. See generally Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440
(1982); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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A. Which Test is Applicable?
Under the disparate treatment model, allegations of
discrimination arise where the employer treats the plaintiff-employee
differently because of the employee's race.23 This model focuses on
the employer's intent.2 4 An example of direct evidence of disparate
treatment based on gender would be where an employer fails to hire a
female applicant and being male is not an essential element of the
position, while simultaneously commenting that "no woman should be
named to a B scheduled job. '25 This is a clear case of gender
discrimination. The more ambiguous (and consequently the more
difficult to prove) cases arise where the discrimination is less overt.
Although the plaintiff does not have to prove there was an expression
of intent on the employer's part, she needs to present circumstantial
evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
26
1. Prima Facie Case and Burden of Proof in a DisparateTreatment Case
In a Title VII cause of action based on the disparate treatment
theory, absent direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff must
present enough circumstantial evidence to create an inference of
discrimination.27 Ultimately, the plaintiff must establish by a
preponderance of evidence that the employer discriminated against
the plaintiff by showing it is more likely than not that racial
discrimination motivated the employer's conduct.28
The Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,29
established the basic framework for a disparate treatment case.30 First,
the employer is under no obligation whatsoever to respond until the
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination.31 In order
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must
show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
23. See McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802.
24. See id.
25. Burns v. Gadsden State Community College, 908 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1990).
26. MACK A. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN A
NUTSHELL 70 (3d ed. 1992).
27. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802.
28. PLAYER, supra note 26, at 71, 77.
29. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 802-03.
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after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.32
However, since facts may vary in Title VII cases, the "specification
above of the prima facie proof required from respondent [sic] is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual
situations." 33 Establishing a prima facie case functions to exclude the
two most obvious explanations for the employer's actions: the plaintiff
employee's lack of qualifications or the defendant employer's lack of
available positions.34 When a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, a rebuttable presumption that the discriminatory act
occurred is created.35 In order to avoid a directed verdict in favor of
the plaintiff, the defendant-employer must articulate some reason for
the employee's rejection.36 Once the employer does this, the
presumption disappears, and the burden of proof shifts once again to
the plaintiff to show the asserted reason is actually a pretext for the
discriminatory act.37 However, the burden of persuasion always
remains with the plaintiff.38
Given the nature of the entertainment industry, it seems doubtful
that a minority actor would be successful in bringing an action under
Title VII if he relied on the disparate treatment model. Generally, the
threshold the plaintiff employee is required to meet in order to
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment is low and
consequently easy to meet.39 In the context of employment of actors
and actresses, however, certain circumstances may make a showing of
a prima facie case more difficult to establish. Specifically, the second
element of the prima facie case, which requires a showing that the
plaintiff was "qualified," may be difficult to establish because of the
extremely subjective nature of hiring and casting.40 Moreover, the
intense competition for the leading roles may deter an actor from even
32. Id. at 802.
33. Id. at 802 n.13.
34. Adjunct Professor Brad Seligman, Lecture for Employment Discrimination at
Hastings College of the Law (Jan. 16, 1997).
35. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
36. Id. at 255.
37. Id. at 256.
38. Id.
39. Adjunct Professor Brad Seligman, Lecture for Employment Discrimination at
Hastings College of the Law (Jan. 27, 1997).
40. Gregory J. Peterson, The Rockettes: Out of Step with the Times? An Inquiry into
the Legality of Racial Discrimination in the Performing Arts, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
351,356 (1985).
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filing a complaint for fear of being labeled a troublemaker amongst
the decision makers of the entertainment industry.41 As discussed
below,42 even if the plaintiff-actress establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the defendant-employer may assert the defense of a
bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ").
2. Adverse Impact Theory
Unlike the disparate treatment theory of discrimination, the
adverse impact theory of employer liability does not depend upon the
employer's intent.43 Instead, one looks at the impact of a particular
company policy or practice (such as an educational requirement) upon
a protected class.44 Thus, "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." 45 If the court finds that an
employer policy or practice causes an adverse or disproportionate
impact on a certain protected minority class, absent a showing that the
requirement is a result of a business necessity, the plaintiff will
prevail.46 This theory requires the employer to prove that the
challenged policy is justified because it is job related and necessary.47
In Griggs v. Duke Power, the Court stated that employment
practices with a disparate impact are prohibited if they "cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, 41 or are "unrelated to
measuring job capability." 49 For example, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has issued guidelines to permit
only the use of job-related tests.50 The Court has held an
41. Id.
42. See infra Part II.B.2.
43. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
44. Id. at 431.
45. Id. at 430.
46. Id. at 431.
47. Id. See also Dothard, 433 U.S. 321.
48. 401 U.S. at 431.
49. Id. at 432.
50. Id. at 434 n.9. EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, issued on
August 24, 1966, provide:
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed ability test" to
mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the
particular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which gives the
employer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular job
or class of jobs.
The EEOC position has been elaborated in the new Guidelines on Employee Selection
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"administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency
(here, the EEOC) is entitled to great deference. ' 51 The fact that the
EEOC, however, has not administered any guidelines regarding
casting criteria again suggests that employment practices in the
performing arts were not intended to be governed by Title VII.
The adverse impact theory applies to subjective requirements, as
well as objective requirements. 52 An example of an objective criterion
is where the employer requires that a "candidate must be at least 5'8"
tall and weigh 170 pounds." 53 Even if the employer establishes a valid
business necessity defense, the plaintiff may still prevail if she can
show that an "alternative employment practice" could equally serve
the employer's legitimate interest and equally predicts the same
outcome (such as job performance), but does not have a
discriminatory effect, and the employer refuses to adopt this
alternative practice. 54
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of adverse impact
discrimination, unlike in disparate treatment cases, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant employer to show that the policy was a
business necessity.5 5 This furthers the purpose of Title VII, which is to
Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (Aug. 1, 1970). These guidelines demand
that employers using tests have available "data demonstrating that the test is predictive of
or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are
relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated." Id. § 1607.4(c).
51. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34.
52. See Watson, 487 U.S. 977. In Watson, the Court applied the adverse impact theory
to subjective criteria, including requirements that the candidate be "communicative, have
leadership skills, and a pleasant personality." Id.
53. Adjunct Professor Brad Seligman, Lecture for Employment Discrimination at
Hastings College of the Law (Feb. 19, 1997). Professor Seligman stated that a specific
height requirement for firefighters could be shown to have an adverse impact on certain
races. Proof of such discrimination could be presented in the form of a comparison. For
example, the plaintiff class may present evidence that in Japan, a country with some of the
most skilled firefighters, the government employs firefighters who are generally shorter
than the required height here in the United States. This comparison proves that a height
requirement is neither job related nor a necessary requirement to be an effective
firefighter.
54. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII (1991), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (1991)).
55. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court stated the
burden of proof does not shift to the defendant in an adverse impact case where the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. Instead, it always remains with the
plaintiff. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, specifically reversed this part of the Wards
Cove decision and re-instated the law under Griggs. It does so by amending Title VII to
add § 703(k)(1)(A):
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under
this title only if-
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provide quality of employment opportunities by removing "artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of a racial or other
impermissible classification." 56 Moreover, it is likely the defendant
employer has more resources and better access to relevant
information such as personnel files, hiring guidelines, and other
records.
Because the burden shifts in adverse impact cases, a minority
actress may have more success bringing a race discrimination case
under this theory than under the disparate treatment theory.
However, a practical problem in bringing an adverse impact case is
that it is usually a class action suit and actors may not have the
numerosity, resources or time to bring such an action. In filing a
charge under the adverse impact theory, the actress will encounter
similar difficulties regarding the problematic aspects of a disparate
treatment case. Moreover, it is clear that Congress did not intend for
Title VII to "guarantee a job to every person regardless of
qualifications." 57
B. Exemptions/Exceptions
1. Bona Fide Occupation Qualification
If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing a case of discrimination
based on the disparate treatment theory, the defendant may avoid
liability if she can establish that a certain criterion-here, "race" -is a
bona fide occupational qualification. Title VII permits discrimination
in hiring and employment in certain circumstances:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter.... it shall
not be unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ... [an employee] on the basis of his religion, sex, or
national origin in those circumstances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph
(C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent
refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
56. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
57. Id. at 430.
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necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.
58
This provision of Title VII allows intentional or unintentional
discrimination where religion, sex, or national origin is a BFOQ. In
order to qualify as a BFOQ, "a job qualification must relate to the
'essence,' or to the 'central mission' of the employer's business." 59
Moreover, the EEOC has adopted a same narrow construction of
the BFOQ exception after it was assigned authority for enforcing the
statute.60 The EEOC has construed the BFOQ exception to be
applicable only to job situations that require specific physical
characteristics such as those necessarily possessed only by one
gender.61 For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,6 2 the Court accepted
gender as a valid BFOQ where the defendant employer asserted that
its requirement for prison guards to be male was related to the essence
of the work, because it involved the safety of inmates and others in the
prison community.63
a. Race as a BFOQ
Even if the casting director can show that a criteria specifying a
race is related to the "essence" of the work, it is evident that race can
never be considered a BFOQ.64 Since "[riace is conspicuously absent
from the exception; the bare statute could lead one to conclude that
there is no exception for either intentional or unintentional racial
discrimination." 65 However, gender may be a valid BFOQ for hiring
an actor or actress where it is necessary for the purposes of
authenticity or genuineness of the character. 66
b. Aesthetic Characteristics in Entertainment
Arguments based upon the aesthetic characteristics of a
particular actor or actress potentially carry the greatest force. In his
article discussing the homogenous racial composition of the
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).
59. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc,, 499 U.S. 187,203 (1991).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1984).
61. See generally Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545-46 (1971);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
62. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Knight v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir.
1981).
65. Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.2(a)(1)(iii), 1604.2(a)(2) (1990).
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"Rockettes," Gregory Peterson proposes "[a] director or
choreographer may sometimes choose a performer or an entire cast
along racial lines simply because of the visual characteristics of a
particular race." 67 However, Peterson goes on to argue that the purest
example of an aesthetic decision would be found in an abstract work
such as abstract dance where the visual component achieves a
heightened level of significance.6 Consequently, Peterson asserts "it
may be doubtful whether the systematic exclusion of minority
members from employment opportunities, an act contravening the
policy of Title VII, can be justified by the mere aesthetic prerogatives
of a stage director." 69
c. Customer Preference
The casting director may also argue that consideration of what
the audience might prefer to view when determining a cast is a valid
BFOQ. This so-called customer preference would be determined by
viewer response. One example of this would be where a minority
actress brings charges of discrimination against the director for casting
a white actress in a role which the minority actress auditioned for that
calls for a minority character. The director may justify her casting
choice by claiming that the white actress is more profitable because of
her status as a star.7' This potential defense arises frequently in the
context of airline flight attendant employment where the airline
company attempts to argue its policy to hire mostly women is based
on customer preference. 71 Although the Supreme Court has never
addressed this issue, the circuit courts seem consistent in ruling that
customer preference is not a valid BFOQ and therefore cannot justify
a discriminatory policy.72 Consequently, it seems clear that a director
would fail if she tried to assert customer preference as a BFOQ.
As illustrated above, establishing a BFOQ subjects the defendant
to a heavy burden. This burden, along with the narrow construction of
67. Peterson, supra note 40, at 361.
68. Id. at 362.
69. Id.
70. Gregory Nava, 'Mi Familia:' Casting for Authenticity, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1995, at
14. Nava suggests Marisa Tomei, an Italian actress, was cast in The Perez Family because
of her "star" status, not because she was the best person for the part.
71. See generally Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971);
Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982).
72. See, e.g., Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994); Rucker v.
Higher Ed. AIDS Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d
1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
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what constitutes a BFOQ suggests it is a disfavored defense.7 This
conclusion is not surprising considering that such criteria, even when
established as a BFOQ, goes directly against the purpose of Title
VII.74 Also, as with establishing a prima facie case of discrimination,
the BFOQ defense does not seem appropriate in the context of
performing arts.
2. Business Necessity
Since "[t]he business necessity standard is more lenient -for the
employer than the statutory BFOQ defense," 75 an employer may raise
this defense in relation to customer preference, because the casting
decision was driven by the box office draw of a particular actress.
However, the business necessity argument is limited to defending an
adverse impact case. Another restriction is that while the legislatively
created BFOQ applies to intentional and unintentional discrimination,
the business necessity doctrine is apparently limited to practices which
are facially neutral but discriminatory in operation.76 However, there
may be conceivable situations where a business necessity exception is
warranted for intentional racial discrimination.
a. Authenticity
In Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners,77 the Fifth
Circuit suggested two situations in which it felt that the business
necessity exception would be warranted even where there was
intentional racial discrimination. 78  First, was "the undercover
infiltration of an all-Negro criminal organization or plainclothes work
in an area where a white man could not pass without notice." 79
Second, the Fifth Circuit stated in dicta that a business necessity
exception may be appropriate in the casting of actors to play certain
73. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 280 (1988). In
discussing the development and history of the BFOQ, Player suggests this defense should
be limited. For instance, he states that the Court "indicat[ed] that the BFOQ defense is an
'extremely narrow exception' that cannot be based upon 'stereotyped characterizations."'
Id. (quoting Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333-34). See also Interpretive Memorandum of Senators
Clark and Case, 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
74. Adjunct Professor Brad Seligman, Lecture for Employment Discrimination at
Hastings College of the Law (Feb. 20, 1997).
75. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
76. Miller, 615 F.2d at 653.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 653.
79. Id. (citing Baker v. St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968)).
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roles.80 "For example, it is likely that a black actor could not
appropriately portray George Wallace, and a white actor could not
appropriately portray Martin Luther King, Jr.""s However, the Fifth
Circuit declined to expand the business doctrine as discussed above.82
The judicially created doctrine of business necessity balances the
employer's prerogatives against the employee's right to employment.
In the context of casting a film about a Chicano family, a director may
have a specific purpose for casting only Latinos-to transmit to the
audience an accurate portrayal of the characters. 83 Arguably,
authenticity in the performing arts is not determined by one's race or
ethnicity. 84 The validity of "authenticity" as a business necessity may
turn on the content of the film-for instance, whether it is a "romantic
comedy" or a "Latino-themed" film. 5
3. Title VII: Legislative Intent
The legislative history and discussion of Title VII indicate
Congress may not have intended the provision to affect the
performing arts. 86 In discussing the limited scope of Title VII,
Senators Clark and Case commented that:
[The BFOQ] exception is a limited right to discriminate on the basis
of religion, sex, or national origin where the reason for the
discrimination is a bona fide occupational qualification. Examples of
such legitimate discrimination would be the preference of a French
restaurant for a French cook, the preference of a professional
baseball team for male players, and the preference of a business
which seeks the patronage of members of particular religious groups
for a salesman of that religion.87
80. Id. at 654.
81. Id.
82. Id. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
83. Nava, supra note 70, at 14. In an interview, film director Nava stated, "[w]ith 'My
Family/Mi Familia,' I wanted to show our culture the way it is ... my insistence in using
only Latinos was one of the obstacles (in making the film), but to me it was more important
not to make the movie than to make it in a ridiculous fashion."
84. See Elaine Dutka, Ethnic Casting Debate Resurfaces in Hollywood Two Latino-
Themed Movies Renew Questions of Box-Office Risks vs. Appropriate Portrayals, L.A.
TIMES, May 18, 1995, at 1. Meyer Gottleib, President of Samuel Goldwyn Co., discussing
the casting of non-Latinos in the movie The Perez Family stated: "There's a profession
called 'acting,' ... Jonathan Pryce took a lot of heat, but turned in a fabulous portrayal of a
Vietnam hustler in 'Miss Saigon."' Id.
85. Id.
86. See 110 CONG. REC. 7213, 7217 (1964).
87. H.R. Doc. No. 7152, 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964).
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These examples indicate that a producer or director need not be
limited by the provisions in Title VII. In fact, legislative history
indicates acting was one area which might be exempt from such
limitations.8 8 Moreover, the Senators explained that
[a]lthough there is no exemption in Title VII for occupations in
which race might be deemed a bona fide job qualification, a director
of a play or movie who wished to cast an actor in the role of a Negro,
could specify that he wished to hire someone with the physical
appearance of a Negro. . . . A movie company making an
extravaganza on Africa may well decide to have hundreds of extras
of a particular race or color to make the movie as authentic as
possible.89
Senators Clark and Case implied in their statement that in casting for
a film, a person's race or ethnicity may determine whether she is
hired.90
C. Other Defenses
1. Artist's/Director's First Amendment Right to Freedom of Expression
The inapplicability of Title VII to the situation above suggests the
issue is beyond the scope of Title VII. Furthermore, Congress'
purpose of Title VII and the language in the legislative history
regarding this matter suggests Congress did not intend to cover this
area of "employment" with Title VII.91 Additionally, applying Title
VII to this particular context runs up against a potential First
Amendment concern.
In resolving this tension, one must defer to the Constitution since
it always supersedes a statute-even where, as here, the statute is
intended to afford constitutional protection.92 "The First Amendment
is implicated because the production of a play [or movie] is a medium
of expression for its director." 93 Since the performance may be
considered a statement in which the actors are the "words" cast by the
director to express that statement, the casting decision should be
88. 110 CONG. REC. at 7217.
89. Id.
90. Peterson, supra note 40, at 354.
91. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution states:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." Id.
93. Sheppard, supra note 3, at 280.
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protected as other words and types of expressive conduct are
protected.94
Although no court has ever decided the issue of "freedom of
casting"95 in theater or film, the First Circuit, in dicta, addressed the
issue in Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra.9 6 In Redgrave, the
First Circuit stated that "the tension between the First Amendment
and civil rights laws is relevant to situations involving race-specific
casting" and "stated it '[did] not think... that liability should attach if
a performing group replaces a black performer with a white performer
(or vice versa) in order to further its expressive interests."' 97
Indeed, where the artist intends to make an assertion or
expression with her work, she has the right to do so in any way she so
desires, even if another person may oppose it. Thus, the right to
require an actress cast as a character in a movie in which the theme
focuses on race relations to be a member of a particular racial or
ethnic group should be protected under the artist's First Amendment
rights. As the media's focus on race relations increases, this right will
become an important legal weapon for the artist who is charged with
race discrimination for requiring the actor to be black, Latino, Asian,
etc.98
Likewise, a casting director who chooses to cast a white actress in
a race-specific role may invoke her First Amendment right when
charged with a violation of Title VII, no matter how offensive it may
be to the audience or other actors. This right would be especially
important where the director has a specific expressive motive for
making such a decision and intends to send a certain message with
that casting decision. "If a director is forced to change his or her
casting criteria because the criteria are found to violate the Civil
Rights Act, the director's message will be altered." 99 However, a
director's invocation of his First Amendment rights may be limited to
where the racial casting is an essential element of the plot and
attempts to transmit some sort of societal message to the audience. 100
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988).
97. Sheppard, supra note 3, at 280-81 (quoting Redgrave v. Boston Symphony
Orchestra, 855 F.2d 888, 904 n.17 (1st Cir. 1988)). See also New York State Club Ass'n v.
New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
98. See, e.g., Don Shirley, Theater Review: Casting's Just One Bug in 'Oleanna' Mamet
Insufficiently Draws the Character in His Political Tract, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, at 1.
99. Sheppard, supra note 3, at 281.
100. Peterson, supra note 40, at 361.
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Moreover, a possible criticism of this type of First Amendment
protection, although not grounded on legal theories, is that "the first
amendment stands as a general obstruction to all progressive
legislative efforts."'' 1 Mark Tushnet argues the First Amendment is
the new "guarantor" for the privileged."° With the decrease in
funding for public broadcasting leading to its impending demise,
Tushnet's argument becomes feasible.10 3
III
Proposal: The "Players" Must Collaborate
In pursuing claims for discrimination based on race, minority
actors and actresses face an apparent dearth of legal remedies.
Additionally, the nature of the entertainment industry discourages
one from pursuing any type of legal recourse. Thus these actors must
resort to non-legal ways of stepping into mainstream media in order to
portray an accurate picture of the American demographic.
A. Non-Traditional/Color-Blind Casting
Non-traditional casting-the placing of minorities, women and
the disabled in roles associated with white, able-bodied male actors-
is one possible solution for minority actors seeking roles.1" The
purpose of non-traditional casting is to demonstrate that "talent, not
necessarily race, gender, ethnicity or physical ability should dictate
casting choices."'0 5 Ideally, the result would be the opening up of
"more jobs for ethnic and minority actors, directors, playwrights,
producers and others in the theater, film and television industries.' 1 6
However, this casting approach may in fact, result in fewer roles for
minority actors and actresses where "reverse" color-blind casting
occurs and a white actor is cast for a minority character. 10 7 Two recent
examples include the casting of Jonathan Pryce, a Welsh actor, as a
101. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1387 (1984).
102. Id.
103. This argument may be explored in future articles but is beyond the scope of this
note.
104. For example, Earl Hyman, a black actor, was cast as the lead in a production of
Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar." See Nancy Churnin, Casting Across the Color Line
Nontraditional Choices Grow, as Theaters Examine Roles, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1989, at 1.
105. Zan Dubin, A Demand for Nontraditional Casting, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1988, at 1.
106. Id.
107. See Color and Casting, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1988, at 99 (letter to the editor).
1998] RACE AS A HIRING/CASTING CRITERION
Eurasian in the Broadway production of "Miss Saigon," and Richard
Gere as a Japanese American in Rhapsody in August. 08
Another problem with blind casting may be the audience's
potential tendency to focus on the ethnicity or race of the actors. With
non-traditional casting, the audience is unrealistically expected to
suddenly become color blind; instead it is likely to become confused.
For instance, in a play (that does not revolve around an ethnic specific
theme) where a black husband and an Asian wife have a white
daughter, the audience might strain to project some social statement
onto the play. Likewise, where a production is "ethnic specific," and
focuses around such a theme, color-blind casting would not be
appropriate. Opponents of color-blind casting also argue that "such
casting often flies in the face of historical reality."' 9
B. Increase Diversity of Roles to Avoid Typecasting Minority Actors
Artists and directors need to create more roles for people of
color." 0 This avenue may also entail adopting the casting guidelines
proposed by Actors' Equity which includes expanding the National
Endowment for the Arts guidelines on artistic content."n An Equity
spokesperson suggested that "minority actors deserve protected
casting at every level of the commercial theater as well." 112 By the
same token, producers must be willing to support the artists, writers,
directors, and actors who endeavor to diversify the contents of mass
media.
Directors may argue that the "pool of applicants," those who
respond to casting calls is a factor in the dearth of minority actors and
108. See David. J. Fox, Gere Casting Rates Softer Protest by Asian Americans, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1990, at 1.
109. William A. Henry, III, Does Color Blindness Count? (Nontraditional Casting in
William Shakespeare's Richard III as well as Miss Saigon), TIME, Aug. 27, 1990, at 67.
110. The dearth of parts for minority actors/actresses has been a consistent complaint.
In 1992, the Association of Asian-Pacific-American-Artists, a watchdog and advocacy
group, had to postpone its awards dinner because of the lack of contenders. See Terry
Pristin, A Look Inside Hollywood and the Movies. Casting Call 'Rising Sun:' There's Good
News and Bad News for Asian-American Actors, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at 26. But see
infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
111. Charlton Heston, Casting-Equity Style-in the Year 1999, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1990, at 3. Actors' Equity filed charges of discrimination in casting against Gordon
Davidson and the Los Angeles Center Theatre Group after Davidson failed to respond to
Equity's recommendations to revamp his casting practices to expand casting of blacks,
Latinos, and Asians, particularly in leading roles. Id. However, since Equity's guidelines
are not federal law, Davidson would not be legally liable.
112. Id.
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actresses.11 3 For example, Actors' Equity filed a grievance with the
League of American Theaters and Producers against the producers of
The Will Rogers Follies, when no minorities were cast.114 Phillip
Oesterman, associate director of the musical simply explained,
"[minority dancers] just didn't come."11 5 In fact, Barry Moss, the
casting director for The Will Rogers Follies, claimed he made specific
casting calls for Black dancers by contacting the Dance Theater of
Harlem, the Alvin Ailey company, and other dance schools, but found
that "[b]lack actors are just not coming out for the calls."'116
C. Audience Activism and Boycotting
To compensate for the possible ineffectiveness of the remedial
methods discussed above, it is imperative that the audience play an
active role in this collaboration. Along with actors and directors, the
audience should shoulder its social responsibility and demand that
movies or television programs cast people of color and refuse to watch
or frequent the showing if the director fails to do so. With the growing
non-white population, this tactic is a feasible solution under certain
circumstances. Although some of such attempts have failed, others
have succeeded." 7 In fact, there has been one case where a movie
based on Latino artists Frida Kahlo and Diego Rivera was canceled
because of a casting controversy. 118
However, audience activism is not without potential problems.
First of all, the practical difficulties in organizing such activism may be
a barrier. Even worse, such activism may actually be counter
productive where productions portraying people of color are
prevented entirely from being produced. At a minimum, the audience
and activist organizations should voice their concerns regarding the
113. Alex Witchel, 'Will Rogers' Casting Drama Continues, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 6, 1992,
at E2.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. John Colapinto, Rated PC, US MAG., Oct. 1993, at 43-47. In his article, Colapinto
cites the futile attempts of Asian-American demonstrators to prevent audience from
buying tickets for the controversial movie The Rising Sun. He asserts that such post-
release protests are not effective and that interest groups must fight to have their concerns
addressed before movies are completed. Colapinto mentions a successful attempt where
the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee lobbied Disney to change an
"Aladdin" lyric which describes a fictional Arab city as a place where "they cut off your
ear if they don't like your face." Disney ended up removing the reference to amputation
for the film's video-cassette release. Id.
118. See Valdez Halts Kahlo Film Over Casting, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19, 1992, at E3.
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unbalanced and unrealistic portrayals of people of color in the
media. 119
D. Public Recognition
Wide spread public recognition is another vehicle that may
encourage audience support and awareness of non-white actors'
endeavors to step into the mainstream media. While the Academy of
Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences Awards honor artists for their
talent and success, "behind the glamour and the glitz, behind the
fantasy of inclusion and opportunity so carefully nurtured by the film
industry, there is the reality that.., out of 150 people nominated in
the top categories (producing, directing, acting, writing)," non-white
artists are patently excluded. 20
However, recognition of non-white artists is not entirely absent in
the entertainment industry. "The NAACP Image Awards honor those
individuals and organizations which have contributed to the positive
portrayal of African Americans in motion pictures, television,
literature and recording."' 121 Similarly, the Golden Eagle Awards
celebrate the talent and culture of Latino artists,122 and the Golden
Ring Awards highlight the achievements of Asian American and
Pacific Islander members of the arts and entertainment community.123
While such recognition alone may be insufficient to alleviate the lack
of diversity in mainstream media, it may encourage decision makers in
the entertainment industry to realize the abundance of non-white
artists and the demand for their talent.
119. Casting of Asians, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1989, at 91 (letter to the editor). Beulah
Ku, Director of Advocacy Association of Asian/Pacific American Artists in Los Angeles
wrote in response to the L.A. Times' article on "The King and I," which did not cast any
Asians as main characters. She wrote, "[t]o use no Asians as principals is unjust and
anachronistic, especially when 'The King and I' is a musical so obviously based on Asian
themes." Id.
120. Reverend Jesse L. Jackson, An Open Letter to the Entertainment Community, IN
MOTION MAG. (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/browse/publish/
rainbow2.html>.
121. Online Conference at the 1996 NAACP Image Awards, PEOPLE (visited Mar. 3,
1998) <http://mouth.pathfinder.comlpeople/interactive/naacptrans2.html>.
122. See Award Winners 1997 Golden Eagle Awards (visited Mar. 2, 1998)
<http://www.newmediatv.net/winners.html>.
123. See Paul Lee Cannon, An All Asian American Affair, ASIANWEEK, S.F. Edition,
Oct. 16-22, 1997, at 21-22.
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IV
Conclusion
Hypothetically, if Laurence Olivier had been denied the role of
Othello in Othello because he is not a black man, it seems likely that
he would not have had a legal cause of action alleging race
discrimination under Title VII of the Act. Current legal remedies for
employees do not seem to encompass the performing arts. Practical
obstacles also work against successful legal actions. Ultimately, this
inability to seek adequate legal redress does not affect the "Laurence
Oliviers" of the performing arts industry. However, inadequate legal
remedies greatly influence the success (or failure) of aspiring, non-
white actors and actresses. Consequently, those who are critically
involved in the entertainment industry must be held responsible to
work together to level the playing field and create equal opportunities
for stardom for all people-regardless of their race or ethnicity. Given
the capitalist nature of our society as well as the current sentiment
regarding affirmative action, however, such collaboration seems
hopeful at best. Consequently, if an actor attempts to file charges and
others follow suit, Congress, not the industry, may be called upon to
legislate appropriate remedies.
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